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I. INTRODUCTION

The pharmaceutical industry as a whole has come under increased
regulatory scrutiny by federal and state governments as well as the
plaintiff's bar over the past several years. While the government is more
rigorously enforcing the laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the
pharmaceutical industry, allegations of fraud and abuse are being
aggressively pursued by governmental agencies, including the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the
various state attorney generals' offices and Medicaid Fraud Control Units.
In addition, on the heels of the government's increased activity, the
plaintiff's bar has seized the opportunity, pursuing qui tam and other civil
actions on behalf of patients, payors, and other persons who have allegedly
been injured.' This recent and continuing focus on the pharmaceutical
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1. A qui tam action is brought under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 - 3730 (2000), commonly
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industry has caused confusion and uncertainty between pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the providers and suppliers with whom they conduct
2
federal health care program business.
This paper attempts to demystify the legal and regulatory environment
surrounding the sale of prescription drug products by covering the most
recent government enforcement actions focusing on the pharmaceutical
industry, the basis for the implementation of a successful compliance
program for pharmaceutical manufacturers, and some of the "hot" legal and
regulatory issues of which pharmaceutical manufacturers and the providers
and suppliers with which they conduct federal health care program business
should be aware in 2006 and beyond.
II. RECENT GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOCUSED ON
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

A. WhY the Focus
There are two primary reasons for the increased interest in prosecuting
and suing pharmaceutical manufacturers. First, from the perspective of the
federal and state governments, the high cost of health care is causing fiscal
budgetary concerns. The increased demand and rising cost of prescription
drugs is blamed as a primary cause of excessive health care costs. The
creation of the Medicare Part D benefit under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), effective
January 1, 2006, is only fueling these concerns by making prescription
drugs available to Medicare beneficiaries.3 The Medicare Part D benefit
means the total dollars spent by the federal government on prescription
drugs should greatly increase in the coming years as compared to the
amount spent historically when only Medicaid included a prescription drug
benefit.
Second, the government views the pursuit of fraud and abuse allegations
in the pharmaceutical industry as a priority and plans to aggressively pursue

known as the False Claims Act, originally enacted in March 1863. The qui tam provisions

allow private citizens to sue, on the government's behalf, companies that defraud the
government. "Qui tam" is short for the Latin phrase, "Qui tam pro domingo rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which roughly means "he who brings an action for the king as
well as for himself."
2. The term "federal health care program" means "any plan or program that provides
health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, and is funded directly, in
whole or in part, by the United States government" or any state health plan. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(f) (2000).
3.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers to recover profits allegedly made at the
expense of taxpayers. The Office of Inspector General Work Plan for
Fiscal Year 20054 identifies work plans for the OIG that specifically focus
on pharmaceutical manufacturers. A similar focus should be expected in
the OIG's 2006 work plans. The OIG's final Compliance Program
Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, released April 28, 2003, also
reveals the government's focus on the industry. 5 Because of the increased
spending on prescription drugs under the federal health care programs, the
government is anticipating an increase in fraudulent schemes and activities.
The OIG Work Plan and Final OIG Guidance, along with an overview of
the focus in the United States Congress on the pharmaceutical industry, are
discussed below.
To date, federal and state governments have regained more than $2.4
billion in payment recoveries and fines from pharmaceutical manufacturers
for claims of fraud and abuse. 6 On the coat-tails of these governmental
manufacturers
actions, private plaintiffs are also targeting pharmaceutical
7
and chasing the same dollars through qui tam lawsuits.
According to Peter Keisler, an Assistant United States Attorney General
for the Civil Division of the DOJ, there were approximately 100
whistleblower cases under seal involving allegations against over 200 drug
manufacturers with respect to 500 different products as of late 2004. 8 If
only one out of ten of these cases settles during 2005 at the same average
amount as the settlements to date, the recoveries in 2005 alone will be about
$2.4 billion. 9 Therefore, the pharmaceutical industry can count on more
cases and settlements in 2006 and beyond. The question going forward is
not whether there will be future settlements, but rather when the settlements
will be announced and how large they will be.

4. Office of Inspector General Work Plan for Fiscal Year 2005 (Oct. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/workplan/2005/2005 / 2OWork%20
Plan.pdf [hereinafter OIG Work Plan].
5. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg.
23731 (May 5, 2003) (hereinafter Final OIG Guidance].

6.
FALSE

ANDY SCHNEIDER, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, THE ROLE OF THE
CLAIMS ACT IN REDUCING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD BY DRUG

MANUFACTURERS: AN UPDATE 17 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.taf.org/publications/
TAFSingle.pdf.
7. See discussion of "qui tam," supra note 1.
8. Peter Keisler, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks to
the TAFEF Conference for Relators' Counsel, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 14, 2004), cited in
SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 5.
9. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 5.
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1.OIG Work Plan
The mission of the OIG is to improve HHS programs and operations by
protecting them against fraud, waste, and abuse.' 0 The OIG Work Plan
identifies the project areas perceived as critical to the mission of the OIG
and HHS."'
Specific to pharmaceutical manufacturers, the OIG Work Plan states that
there will be continued focus on certain Medicare and Medicaid drug
reimbursement issues, including average sales price, average manufacturer
price (AMP), average wholesale price (AWP), "best price," classification of2
generic versus brand-name drugs, and off-label drug promotion.
Regarding average sales price, the OIG plans to conduct several studies in
2005 related to the computation of average sales price for various drugs,
measure pharmaceutical manufacturers' methodologies for computing
average sales price, and assess the adequacy of the system of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services of the HHS (CMS) for collecting and
maintaining average sales price data.' 3 As for the Medicaid drug rebate
programs, the OIG will assess CMS's oversight of pharmaceutical
manufacturers' reporting of average manufacturer price, average wholesale
price, "best price," and the classification of generic versus brand-name
drugs to ensure that Medicaid programs do not overpay for prescription
drugs. 14 The OIG intends to continue evaluating the adequacy of state
systems to calculate and collect Medicaid drug rebates.' 5 The OIG also
plans to assess the United States Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
oversight and review of allowable
promotion of off-label drug uses by
6
pharmaceutical manufacturers.'
The OIG and FDA are clearly focused on pharmaceutical manufacturers
and want to ensure that applicable laws, rules, and regulations are followed
in marketing, obtaining, using, and distributing prescription drugs in order
to deter the alleged practice of price inflation by those producers.

10. See
OIG
Mission,
available
at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/organization/
OlGmission.html.
11. OIG Work Plan, supranote 4, Introduction at 1.
12
Id. at Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Studies at 30-31, Public Health Agencies at
6. Average sale price is used for determining the Medicare reimbursement of certain classes
of drugs. Average manufacturer price is used for Medicaid drug rebate purposes and is
based on actual sales for drug manufacturers. Average wholesale price is the published
catalogue price that most states use as a basis for Medicaid drug reimbursement and also for
prescription drugs under the Medicare Part B program.
13. Id.at Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Studies at 14-15, 30.
14
Id. atCenters for Medicare & Medicaid Studies at 30-31.
15. Id.at Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Studies at 31.
16. OIG Work Plan, supranote 4, Public Health Agencies at 6.
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2. OIG Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
The Final OIG Guidance is the eleventh set of voluntary guidelines
published by the OIG. It outlines the principal fraud and abuse risk areas
for pharmaceutical manufacturers including the integrity of data used by
federal and state governments to establish payment amounts, kickbacks and
other illegal remuneration, and compliance with laws regulating drug
samples. 7 The Final OIG Guidance is intended to put pharmaceutical
manufacturers on notice of the OIG's concern about preventing and
reducing fraud and abuse in the federal health care programs related to
prescription drugs.' 8
3. Senator Chuck Grassley's Comments
Senator Chuck Grassley, the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance, was the author of the qui tam whistleblower amendments to the
False Claims Act (FCA). '9 Enforcement of the FCA and its whistleblower
provisions has returned more than S12 billion to the United States Treasury
since it was updated in 1986.20
In a May 13, 2004, memorandum issued to reporters and editors, Senator
Grassley commented:
We need to see continued aggressive investigation and pursuit of fraud
against the taxpayers by pharmaceutical drug manufacturers.
Whistleblowers can be a valuable part of that effort .. and the Justice
Department obviously must staY committed and send a clear message of
zero tolerance. Drug companies that illegally pad their profits with
Medicaid dollars that should be going to help low-income people,
including pregnant women and children, must be held accountable.' I
Senator Grassley's letter to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, written
on the same date, emphasized that during the remainder of the 108th
Congressional session, the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance would

17. Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,732.
18. Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,731.
19. Memorandum from Senator Chuck Grassley, Chair of the U.S. Senate Comm. on
Fin. (May 13, 2004), availableat http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prg051304.pdf
[hereinafter the Grassley Memo]. The FCA imposes civil liability on persons or

corporations who, among other things: (1) knowingly present or cause to be presented a false
or fraudulent claim for payment to the government; (2) knowingly use a false record or
statement to obtain payment on a false or fraudulent claim paid by the government; or (3)
engage in a conspiracy to defraud the government to obtain allowance for or payment of a
false or fraudulent claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
20. Grassley Memo, supranote 19.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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continue to look closely at the business practices of drug companies with
respect to the federal health care programs and the exorbitant costs that
American taxpayers are paying for drugs.22 Grassley quoted a non-profit
organization, Taxpayers Against Fraud, as follows:
Since 2001, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has settled seven cases
involving allegations of Medicare and Medicaid drug pricing and
marketing fraud against six pharmaceutical manufacturers: AstraZeneca,
Bayer, Dey, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and TAP Pharmaceuticals...
[a]mong these are three of the top five companies (by sales volume) in
the industry: Pfizer (#1), GlaxoSmithKline (#2), and AstraZeneca (#5).
The total paid out by these manufacturers to settle these cases is nearly
$1.66 billion ...Remarkably, these recoveries resultedfrom allegations
involvingjust a handful of drug products.23

Senator Grassley further stated that:
Every one of these settlements involved Medicaid liability and likely
represents just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. With astronomical
profits at hand, it appears that some drug companies are not always
abiding by the letter of the law, and in other cases not abiding by the
spirit of the law ...Any drug company that improperly lines its pockets
with Medicaid dollars, which are intended to benefit low-income
Americans, pregnant women and poor children, should know that
America's taxpayers, myself included, expect that it should be held fully
accountable. 24
In April 2004, Senator Grassley and Senator Max Baucus sent letters to
nineteen different drug companies requesting pricing information on eight
different classes of drugs. - The main focus of the inquiry was the use of
the nominal price exception to "best price" reporting. The letter quoted the
Final OIG Guidance, in part, as follows:
Discounting arrangements are prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry
and deserve careful scrutiny particularly because of their potential to
implicate the Best Price requirements of the Medicaid Rebate Program.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24 Id.
25. Grassley Memo, supra note 19. These nineteen drug companies were Pfizer, Inc.,
GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP,
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Amgen, Inc., Wyeth

Pharmaceuticals, Eli Lilly & Company, Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc., Abbott Laboratories,
Hoffman-La Roche Inc., TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc., Schering-Plough Corporation,
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., SanofiSynthelabo, and Eisai, Inc.
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Because the Medicaid Rebate Program in many instances requires that
states receive rebates based on the Best Price offered by a pharmaceutical
manufacturer to other purchasers, manufacturers have a strong financial
incentive to hide defacto pricing concessions to other purchasers to avoid
passing on the same discounts to the states. Because of the potential
direct and substantial effect of such practices on federal health care
program expenditures and the interest of some manufacturers in avoiding
price concessions that would trigger rebates to the states, any
remuneration from a manufacturer to a purchaser, however characterized,
6
should be carefully scrutinized.
In June 2005, Senators Grasslev and Baucus again sent letters to twenty-

three different drug companies asking them to explain their "educational
grant" programs, which are marketing practices by which the companies
give money to state governments and other organizations in forms of
grants. 27 The senators are concerned that these grants are more focused on
product promotion than education, and may improperly influence Medicare
and Medicaid purchasing decisions. 28 The letter stated, in part:
The Committee has identified the use of grants, particularly educational
grants, as a practice with potential for abuse and has gathered the
following background information on this topic. The use of educational
grants was an element in a recent settlement involving off-label
promotion of a prescription drug.
Also, educational grants were
identified by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of
Inspector General (HHS OIG) as a key risk area in its OIG Compliance
Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (OIG Guidance),
issued in 2003. In addition, existing Federal and industry guidance is not
specific about what activities educational grants may be used to support
or what kinds of organizations may provide those activities, and it
appears that some manufacturers may be using organizational grants to

26. Id. (quoting Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,735).
27. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Drug Companies Asked for More
Information About Grant Money Awarded to Promote Particular Medicines (June 10, 2005),
available at http://finance.senate.gov, press/Gpress/2005/prg061005.pdf [hereinafter Finance
Committee Press Release]. These twenty-three drug companies were Pfizer, Inc.,
GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP,
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Amgen, Inc., Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals, Eli Lilly & Company, Sanofi Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc., Eisai, Inc.,
Boehringer Ingetheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Schering-Plough Corporation, Hoffman-La
Roche Inc., Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Abbott Laboratories, Genetech, Inc., Biogen Idec
Inc., Genzyme Corporation, Chiron Corporation, Serono, Inc., andTAP Pharmaceutical
Products Inc.
28. Finance Committee Press Release, supra note 27.
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fund activities primarily to promote their products.

B. Recent FederalGovernment Settlements
The large dollar amount of payment recoveries and fines, along with the
large number of pending cases and investigations, clearly demonstrates that
federal and state governmental authorities have been actively investigating
and prosecuting a number of practices by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
All indications are that the government's scrutiny of pharmaceutical
manufacturers will continue, and will likely even increase, during the rest of
2006 and the years that follow.
The landmark TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. settlement in 2001 set
the standard for future settlements with pharmaceutical manufacturers for
fraudulent drug pricing and marketing activities. This was the first FCA
settlement with a drug manufacturer involving both civil and criminal fines.
TAP agreed to pay a total of $875 million in criminal fines and civil
liabilities.30
A summary of the six most recent federal government settlements with
pharmaceutical manufacturers follows. These settlements are significant
because they demonstrate the DOJ's commitment to health care fraud
enforcement generally and the more specific goal of combating fraud by
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 31
The DOJ has announced that it is
committed to rooting out and prosecuting health care fraud to protect
Americans from inappropriate conduct by pharmaceutical manufacturers.32
1. "Value Added" Packages, "Data Fees," and "Risk-Sharing"
Arrangements
On July 29, 2004, Schering Sales Corp., the sales and marketing
subsidiary of drug manufacturer Schering-Plough Corporation, agreed to
pay $345 million to settle criminal and civil charges for the fraudulent
pricing and illegal marketing of Claritin.33 Schering was charged with
offering and paying Cigna Healthcare, a health maintenance organization, a

29.

Id.

30. Press Release, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others Charged with
Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm.
31.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Schering-Plough to Pay $345 Million to
Resolve Criminal and Civil Liabilities for Illegal Marketing of Claritin (July 30, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04 civ-523.htn [hereinafter Schering

Press Release].
32. See Schering Press Release, supra note 31.
33. Id.
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kickback to induce Cigna to keep Claritin on its formulary (the list of drugs
that Cigna covers for its beneficiaries). 34 Following Cigna's decision to
remove Claritin from its formulary, Schering offered to make up the
difference between the price of Claritin and the less expensive alternative
Allegra by offering Cigna a "value added" package in lieu of an actual price
reduction on Claritin. 3 5 The government alleged that the package included
a kickback disguised as a "data fee" of 2% of the value of Schering drugs
(the "data fee" in 2000 totaled $2.4 million), $3 million worth of deeply
discounted Claritin Reditabs, health management services at far below fair
market value, and an interest-free loan in the form of prepaid rebates. 36
Inannouncing the settlement, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Patrick L. Meehan, said:
Schering used terms like 'data fee' and 'value added' as camouflage for

what was nothing more than an old-fashioned kickback.

..

This wasn't a

mistake. It was a marketing strategy. The result was that programs
created to provide healthcare to the poorest among us were actually

paying more for drugs than those who have private health insurance.
There is a point at which pursuit of market share crosses the line that
separates competition and illegal conduct. This case serves as 37an
example that the consequences of stepping over that line can be costly.
Schering's actions also gave rise to civil liability under the FCA. Under
the Medicaid drug rebate statute, drug manufacturers are required to report
their "best prices" to the federal government and to pay quarterly rebates to
Medicaid to ensure that the nation's insurance program for the poor
receives the benefit of the most favorable drug prices offered to other large
purchasers of drugs. 38 Schering attempted to avoid additional rebate
obligations under the Medicaid drug rebate program by funding significant
concessions to Cigna and another health maintenance organization,
PacifiCare Health Systems, through an assortment of payments and services
to disguise the ultimate fact that Schering was offering a lower price for
Claritin and not reporting this lower price to the government.3 9 With Cigna,
Schering offered the "value added" package that included "data fees. 4 °
With PacifiCare, Schering entered into a "risk sharing" agreement, whereby
Schering effectively lowered the price of Claritin by paying a portion of
34.

Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2003).
Schering Press Release, supra note 31.

40.

Id.
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PacifiCare's costs for antihistamine drugs.4
Under the terms of the settlement, Schering agreed to: (1) plead guilty
and pay a $52.5 million fine for violating the Medicare and Medicaid
Patient Protection Act of 1987 (Anti-Kickback Statute) by paying kickbacks
to customers in exchange for the preferred treatment of Claritin on its
formulary; (2) settle its liability under the FCA and pay the United States,
all fifty state Medicaid programs, and certain public health service entities
S292,969,482 as a result of Schering's failure to report its true "best price"
for Claritin; and (3) enter into a corporate integrity agreement with the HHS
that addressed sales, marketing and pricing of its drugs to government
programs in order to correct its government pricing and Medicaid rebate
reporting failures.42 As a result of the criminal plea, Schering is excluded
from participation in all federal health care programs for at least five
years .4

The whistleblowers that began this case, Charles Alcorn, Beatrice
Manning and Raymond Pironti, Jr., all former employees of ITG, Inc., a
subsidiary of Schering, will receive $31.6 million of the government's civil
recovery. 44
41
Id. Over three years, Schering's "risk sharing" payments to PacifiCare totaled $25
million. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 12.
42 Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2003). The Anti-Kickback Statute provides, in
pertinent part, that:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind - (A) in return for referring an individual to a person
for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than S25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind to any person to induce such person - A) to refer an individual to a
person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care
program, or (B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than S25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
43. Schering Press Release, supra note 31. See also Settlement Agreement and Release
by and among the United States of America, Schering-Plough Corp., Charles Alcorn,
Beatrice Manning and G. Raymond Pironti, Jr. 1, 20 (July 29, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2004/jul/jul04.html.
44. Schering Press Release, supra note 31.
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2. Off-Label Marketing, "Consulting Meetings," and "Independent Medical
Education" Events
On May 13, 2004, Warner-Lambert Company, a subsidiary of Pfizer
Inc., agreed to plead guilty and pay more than $430 million to resolve
criminal charges and civil liabilities in connection with its Parke-Davis
division's illegal and fraudulent promotion of unapproved uses for the drug
Neurontin.4 5 Under the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), a company must specify the intended uses of a product in its
new drug application to the FDA.46 Once approved, the drug may not be
marketed or promoted for so-called "off-label" uses, which are any uses not
specified in an application and approved by the FDA.4 7 It was alleged that
Warner-Lambert's strategic marketing plans showed "that Neurontin was
aggressively marketed to treat a wide array of ailments for which the drug
was not approved.-A4 8 Warner-Lambert used a number of tactics to achieve
its marketing goals, including encouraging sales representatives to provide
one-on-one sales pitches to physicians about off-label uses of Neurontin,
making false or misleading statements to health care professionals
regarding Neurontin's efficacy and whether it had been approved by the
FDA for the off-label uses, and paying doctors to attend "consulting
meetings" and "independent medical education" at which Warner-Lambert
paid for expensive dinners, lavish weekends, and trips to Florida, and even
paid for physicians who would listen to presentations about off-label uses of
Neurontin to visit the 1996 Atlanta Olympics and Hawaii. 49 The DOJ said
that these tactics were part of a coordinated national effort to implement an
off-label marketing plan without seeking FDA approval for any of the new
uses. 50 Warner-Lambert not only promoted Neurontin for off-label uses,
but even promoted it for uses even when scientific studies had shown it to
be ineffective.51
In announcing the settlement, Associate United States Attorney General
Robert D. McCallum, Jr. stated:
The Department of Justice is committed to rooting out and prosecuting

45. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to
Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04 civ 322.htm [hereinafter

Warner Lambert Press Release].
46. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1999).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (1999).
48. Warner-Lambert Press Release, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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health care fraud ... It is of paramount importance that the Department
use every legal tool at its disposal to assure the health and safety of the
consumers of America's health care system, and to pursue companies and
individuals that steal from the taxpayers and inflict suffering on patients
and families. The Department's commitment to effective health care
fraud enforcement is driven by a mandate that wrongdoers be brought to
justice, to deter conduct which threatens the safety and welfare of all
Americans, and the need to protect the resources of the Medicare Trust
52
Fund, state Medicaid programs, and other government health programs.

Massachusetts
commented:

United

States Attorney,

Michael

J. Sullivan,

also

This illegal and fraudulent promotion scheme corrupted the information
process relied upon by doctors in their medical decision making, thereby
putting patients at risk... This scheme deprived federally-funded
Medicaid programs across the country of the informed, impartial
judgment of medical professionals - judgment on which the program

relies to allocate scarce financial resources to provide necessary and
appropriate care to the poor. The pharmaceutical industry will not be
allowed to profit from such conduct nor subject the poor, the elderly and
other persons insured by state and federal health care programs to
experimental
drug uses which have not been determined to be safe and
53
effective.

Warner-Lambert and Pfizer agreed to the following under the terms of
their settlement: (1) to plead guilty to two counts of violating the FDCA
with regard to its misbranding of Neurontin by failing to provide adequate
direction for use and by introduction into interstate commerce of an
unapproved new drug, and to pay a $240 million criminal fine; (2) to settle
its federal civil FCA liabilities and pay the United States a total of $83.6
million, plus interest, in civil damages for losses suffered by the federal
portion of the Medicaid program as a result of Warner-Lambert's fraudulent
drug promotion and marketing misconduct; (3) to settle its civil liabilities to
the fifty states and the District of Columbia in the amount of $68.4 million,
for losses the state Medicaid programs suffered as a result of fraudulent
drug promotion and marketing misconduct; (4) to settle its civil liabilities to
the fifty states and the District of Columbia in the amount of $38 million for
harm caused to consumers and to fund a remediation program to address the
effects of Warner-Lambert's improper marketing scheme; and (5) to enter
into a corporate integrity agreement to ensure that the changes Pfizer made

52.
53.

Id.
Id.
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after acquiring Warner-Lambert in June 2000 are effective in training and
supervising its marketing and sales staff.54
The whistleblower in this case, Dr. Franklin, a former medical liaison for
Warner-Lambert, will receive $24.64 million of the civil recovery. 55
3. Marketing the Spread and Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act
a. Warrick
On May 3, 2004, Schering Corporation, Schering-Plough Corporation,
and Warrick Pharmaceuticals Corporation (a division of Schering-Plough
Corporation), agreed to pay the United States and the State of Texas a total
of $27 million to settle allegations of health care fraud.56 Warrick
manufactures prescription drugs for the treatment of allergies and
respiratory diseases. 57 The government alleged that Warrick submitted
false pricing information and caused providers to submit fraudulentlyinflated reimbursement claims to the state and federally-funded Texas
Medicaid program. 58 The United States claimed Warrick submitted false
pricing information to the Texas Vendor Drug Program, which resulted in
inflated reimbursement for the Warrick drugs at issue, which are primarily
used to treat asthma and other respiratory conditions. 59
b. Dey
On June 11, 2003, Dey, Inc., a manufacturer of prescription drugs for the
treatment of allergies and respiratory diseases, agreed to pay the United
States and the State of Texas a total of $18.5 million to settle allegations of
health care fraud. 60 The government alleged that the company submitted
false pricing information and caused providers to submit fraudulentlyinflated reimbursement claims to the state and federally-funded Texas

54. Warner-Lambert Press Release, supra note 45.
55. Id.
56. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Schering-Plough to Pay U.S. & Texas $27
Million to Settle Medicaid Fraud Allegations (May 3, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04 civ 292.htm [hereinafter Schering-Plough Texas

Press Release].
57. Schering-Plough Texas Press Release, supra note 56.

58.
59.

Id.
Id.

60. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company, Dey, Inc. to Pay
U.S. & Texas S18.5 Million to Settle Allegations of Medicaid Fraud (June 11, 2003),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03 civ 350.htm [hereinafter Dey Texas
Press Release].
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Medicaid program. 6' The United States claimed that Dey submitted false
pricing information to the Texas Vendor Drug Program, which resulted in
inflated reimbursement for the Dey drugs at issue, the asthma inhalants
Albuterol Sulfate and Ipratropium Bromide.62 The Civil Medicaid Fraud
Section of the Texas Attorney General's office sued Dey as part of its
ongoing effort to combat Medicaid fraud in Texas.63 In addition, pursuant
to the Settlement Agreement and Release, Dey agreed to certain reporting
requirements in the Texas Vendor Drug Program.64
4. "Free Samples" of Zoladex
On June 20, 2003, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals pleaded guilty and
agreed to pay a total of $355 million in a criminal and civil settlement
relating to the pricing and marketing of Zoladex, a drug used for treating
prostate cancer. 65 AstraZeneca allegedly provided thousands of "free
samples" of Zoladex to physicians "knowing and expecting" that some
physicians would prescribe the drug samples to their patients and bill
Medicare, Medicaid, TriCare, and other federal governmental health care
programs for the samples.66 The government also alleged that AstraZeneca
offered and paid illegal remuneration in various forms including free
Zoladex, unrestricted educational grants, business assistance grants and
services, travel and entertainment, consulting services, and honoraria to
induce physicians to prescribe the drug.6 Other allegations included that
AstraZeneca: (1) marketed the spread between the Medicare average
wholesale price and the discounted price to physicians as additional profit
to be returned to the physician's practice from Medicare reimbursements for
Zoladex under a "Return-to-Practice" program; (2) set the average
wholesale price for Zoladex at levels far higher than the majority of its
physician customers actually paid for the drug, resulting in reimbursement
to the physicians at significantly higher levels than their actual costs or the
average wholesale price; and (3) failed to provide its "best price" for

61.

62
63.
64.
of the

Dey Texas Press Release, supra note 60.

Id.
Id.
Settlement Agreement and Release by and between the State of Texas, Ven-a-Care
Florida Keys, Inc. and Dey, L.P. and Dey, Inc., No. GV002327 (June 11, 2003),

availableat http://www.taf.org/settlemetns/dey.pdf.

65. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals Pleads Guilty to
Healthcare Crime, Company Agrees to Pay $355 Million to Settle Charges (June 20, 2003),
available

at

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03-civ 371 .htm

[hereinafter

AstraZeneca Press Release].
66. AstraZeneca Press Release, supra note 65.
67.

Id.
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Zoladex to state Medicaid programs by not accounting for off-invoice price
concessions provided in the form of services and free goods and grants that
were contingent on purchase requirements. 68
AstraZeneca plead guilty to conspiring to violate the Prescription Drug
70
Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA) 69 and paid a $63,872,156 criminal fine.
To settle its FCA liabilities, AstraZeneca paid the federal government a
total of $266,127,844. 7 1 AstraZeneca also agreed to pay an additional
$24,900,000 to the federal government and the states.72 AstraZeneca agreed
to comply with the terms of a corporate integrity agreement which requires,
among other things, that it will report to the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and will promote, through internal training and other programs
and policies, marketing and sales practices that are in full compliance with
applicable laws, rules, and regulations.73 In addition, three physicians have
been charged, and two have pleaded guilty, for their role in conspiring to
bill for Zoladex samples.74

In this case, the whistleblower, Douglas Durand, formerly the Vice
President of Sales for AstraZeneca's competitor, TAP, will receive
approximately $47.5 million.7 5
5. "Lick and Stick" Scheme
On April 16, 2003, pharmaceutical companies Bayer Corporation and
SmithKline Beecham Corporation (doing business as GlaxoSmithKline),
agreed to pay a total of $344 million to settle a Medicaid FCA
68.

Id.

69.

21 U.S.C. § 353 (1994). Among other things, the PDMA requires state licensing of

wholesale distributors of prescription drugs; requires unauthorized wholesale distributors to
provide purchasers a statement (also called a pedigree) identifying each prior sale of the
drug; and with certain exceptions, prohibits the sale of, or offer to sell, prescription drugs
that have been purchased by a hospital or other health care entity or that have been donated
or supplied at a reduced price to a charitable organization. According to the FDA's Report

to Congress in 2001, the PDMA was enacted to ensure that prescription drug products
purchased by consumers would be safe and effective and to avoid an unacceptable risk that
counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent, or expired drugs were being sold to the
American public.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE

PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETING ACT: REPORT TO CONGRESS

(June 2001), available at

http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdma/report2001/#background.
70. Astra Zeneca Press Release, supranote 65.

71.
72.
73.
of the

Id.
Id.
Id. See also Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Office of Inspector General
Dep't of Health and Human Services and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and

AstraZeneca LP (June 20, 2003), availableat http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/
AstraZeneca06O42003.PDF.
74. AstraZeneca Press Release, supranote 65.

75.

Id.
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whistleblower case.16 The suit alleged that Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline
engaged in a "lick and stick" scheme to avoid paying drug rebates to the
federal government. 7' Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline allegedly offered
discounted prices on certain drugs, such as Bayer's antibiotic Cipro and
high blood-pressure drug Adalat, and GlaxoSmithKline's antidepressant
Paxil and nasal spray Flonase, to Kaiser Permanente Medical Care
Program, one of the nation's largest health maintenance organizations,78
under a "private label" to avoid having to rebate the federal government.
The concealment technique used was "lick and stick," whereby the
manufacturer placed Kaiser's national drug code number rather than the
manufacturer's national drug code number on the label, and then did not
report Kaiser's discounted price to the federal government for the purposes
of calculating the Medicaid rebate.79 In the case of Paxil, GlaxoSmithKline
was alleged to have sold the drug in bulk quantities to Kaiser, which in turn
repackaged and relabeled the drug with its own national drug code
number. 80
Bayer agreed to pay $5.6 million in criminal fines, which were imposed
in connection with Bayer's guilty plea to violating the FDCA by failing to
list a private label product with the FDA.8' Bayer also agreed to pay $251
million in civil recoveries to the federal government and forty-nine state
governments and the District of Columbia, of which $109 million was
distributed among the states, $9.5 million was distributed among certain
safety net hospitals and clinics, and the remaining $133 million was paid to
the federal government. 12 In addition, Bayer entered into an addendum to
its corporate integrity agreement, which had been in place since January 23,
2001, to ensure the implementation of a compliance program, reporting of
average sales price and independent review of managed care transactions. 83
76. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bayer Corporation and GlaxoSmithkline to Pay
S344 Million to Resolve Allegations of Health Care Fraud Against State Programs (Apr. 16,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ma/presspage [hereinafter Bayer Press
Release].
77. Bayer Press Release, supra note 76.
78. Melody Peterson, Bayer Agrees to Pay $257 Million in Drug Fraud,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2003, at C1.
79. Bayer Press Release, supra note 76.

80. Id.
81

Id.

X2
Id; ANDY SCHNEIDER, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, REDUCING
MDI(CARF AND MEDICAID FRAUD BY DRUG MANUFACTURERS: THE ROLE OF THE FALSE

CLAIS ACT 33 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.taf.org/publications%5CPDF%5Cdrug

%20rcport.pdf.
83

Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Office of Inspector General of the

Department of Health and Human Services and Bayer Corporation and Addendum (Jan. 23,
2001 & Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Bayer
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GlaxoSmithKline, which did not face criminal charges, agreed to pay
$87.6 million in civil damages to the federal government, forty-nine state
governments, and the District of Columbia.84 Of that amount, $38.3 million
went to the states, $2.6 million was distributed to safety net hospitals and
clinics, and the remaining $46.8 million was returned to the federal
government. 85 GlaxoSmithKline also entered into a corporate integrity
agreement to ensure the implementation of a compliance program and
independent review of contract pricing.86
The settlement against GlaxoSmithKline was the first nationwide fraud
settlement to include payment to public health service entities, which
include community health centers and disproportionate share hospitals. The
whistleblower was the late George Couto, a Bayer marketing executive.
His estate will receive approximately $34.2 million as a result of the
settlement.

III. BASIS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM FOR PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS

In the current regulator. environment, the increased likelihood of
prosecution of pharmaceutical manufacturers who run afoul of the laws,
rules, and regulations applicable to their federal health care program
businesses should heighten the importance of compliance programs given
by manufacturers. The main historical significance of compliance programs
as a mitigating factor under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is still as
crucial as ever, but compliance as a means of prevention and staying off the
government's radar screen in the first place should now be given equal or
even greater priority.
A. Summar of Compliance Guidancefor PharmaceuticalManufacturers
This section discusses the seven primary industry and governmental
sources of compliance guidance for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Although this guidance is voluntary, and no penalties may be imposed
based on the failure to follow it, when all the available guidance is read in
concert, pharmaceutical manufacturers and the providers and suppliers with
which they conduct federal health care program business have the benefit of

Corporation 120301 .PDF [hereinafter Bayer Corporate Integrity Agreement].
84. Bayer Press Release, supra note 76.
85. SCHNEIDER, supra note 82, at 35.
86. Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services and SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a
GlaxoSmithKline (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/
agreements/SmithKlineBeecham Corp dba GlaxoSmithKline041503.PDF.
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a fairly clear picture or roadmap of the rules by which at least the
government and industry sources believe they should conduct their
operations. One Assistant United States Attorney General has commented
that no pharmaceutical manufacturer should want to be the last one to
comply, based on the amount of guidance available.87
1. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
The Final OIG Guidance, published in 2003, sets forth the general views
of the OIG on "the value and fundamental principles of compliance
programs for pharmaceutical manufacturers and the specific elements that
pharmaceutical manufacturers should consider when developing and
implementing an effective compliance program.",88 The stated purpose of
the Final OIG Guidance is to encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers to
use internal controls to efficiently monitor adherence to applicable statutes,
regulations, and federal health care program requirements themselves, as
well as the providers and suppliers with which they conduct federal health
care program business. 89 In the past several years the OIG has also
published compliance program guidance for other parts of the health care
industry including hospitals, home health agencies, clinical laboratories,
third-party medical billing companies, durable medical equipment,
Medicare+Choice organizations offering coordinated care, hospices,
nursing facilities, individual and small group practices, and ambulance
suppliers. 90
It is not mandatory that pharmaceutical manufacturers use the Final OIG
Guidance. The OIG specifically states that the Final OIG Guidance is only
intended to present voluntary guidance to the industry instead of providing
binding standards for pharmaceutical manufacturers. 9' It also is not a
compliance program itself. The Final OIG Guidance is a set of guidelines
that pharmaceutical manufacturers should consider when developing and
implementing a compliance program or evaluating
an existing one;
92
accordingly, it should be viewed as a benchmark.
According to the OIG, a comprehensive compliance program provides a
mechanism that addresses the public and private sectors' mutual goals of
reducing fraud and abuse, while enhancing health care provider operational

87.

James Sheehan, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the

University of Texas Health Law Seminar, Houston, Texas (Apr. 2003).
88. See Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,731.
89. Id.at 23,731.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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functions, thereby improving the quality of health care services while
reducing the cost of health care. 3 In addition to avoiding submitting false
or inaccurate pricing or rebate information or engaging in improper
marketing activities, the OIG identified the additional benefits to
pharmaceutical manufacturers from the voluntarily implementation of a
compliance program, including:
" A concrete demonstration of the company's commitment to
honest and responsible corporate conduct to employees and the
community-at-large;
*

An increased likelihood of preventing (or at least identifying)
and correcting unlawful and unethical behavior at an early stage;

*

A mechanism to encourage employees to report potential
problems and allow for appropriate internal inquiry and
corrective action, and

*

Minimizing any financial loss to the government and any
corresponding financial 4 loss to the company through early
detection and reporting.9

The OIG recognizes that the implementation of a compliance program
may not entirely eliminate improper conduct from a pharmaceutical
manufacturer's business operations. However, an effective compliance
program that demonstrates a good faith effort by the company to comply
with applicable laws, rules, and regulations significantly reduces the risk of
unlawful conduct and any resulting penalties.9 5
2. AOA Guidelines on Industry Gifts to Physicians
The American Osteopathic Association's (AOA) House of Delegates
provided the following guidelines for professional conduct relating to gifts
and subsidies offered to AOA members by representatives of
pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies:
(1) Gifts to physicians should be related to patient care or medical
practice and should be of modest value. Gifts of cash should not be
accepted.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 23,732.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,732.
Id
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(2) Individual physicians should not accept financial subsidies from
industry to defray the cost of attendance at professional
conferences.
(3) Financial support or gifts from industry for transportation, lodging
and related expenses for trips which are for primarily recreational
and social functions should not be accepted.
(4) Gifts by industry to students, interns, residents and fellows for
professional travel are appropriate if the recipient is selected by the
college, training institution, or the sponsor of an educational
event.96

In addition to these guidelines, the AOA also recommended compliance
with the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
guidelines. 97
3. PhRMA Code of Interactions with Health Care Professionals
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
adopted its Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals on July 1,
2002, to govern the pharmaceutical industry's relationships with physicians
and other health care professionals.9 8 PhRMA is an industry trade group
representing
research-based
pharmaceutical
and
biotechnology
companies. 99
The PhRMA Code provides voluntary guidance addressing interactions
with respect to marketed drug products and related pre-launch activities. It
specifically does not address clinical investigators relating to pre-approved
studies.' 00
Members of PhRMA are strongly encouraged to adopt
procedures to assure adherence to the PhRMA Code.'0 '
The PhRMA Code primarily focuses on five main points:
96. See Am. Osteopathic Ass'n Position Papers, Resolution on Industry Gifts to
Physicians, adopted 1991, revised 1994, 1999, 2003; http://www.osteopathic.org/pdf/aoapostiong-n.pdf at 57-58 [hereinafter AOA Resolution on Gifts].
97. AOA Resolution on Gifts, supra note 96.
98. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers Ass'n, PhRMA Adopts New Marketing

Code (Apr. 19, 2002),
[hereinafter PhRMA Code].
99.

http://phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/19.04.2005.388.cfm

PhRMA Code, supra note 98.

100. PhRMA Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, at 1,
http://docme.mc.duke.edu/Resources/PhRMA%20Code.pdf
[hereinafter
Code
on
Interactions].
101.

Code on Interactions, supra note 100, at 5.
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(1) General Interaction. Interaction should focus on informing the
health care professional about scientific and educational
information and supporting scientific medical research and
education to maximize patient benefits.
(2) Entertainment. Interaction should not include entertainment and
must occur at a venue conducive to providing scientific or
educational information. Specifically, this means no "dine and
dash" or recreational events (for example, sporting events or spa
visits).
(3) Continuing Education. Companies can provide support to the
conference sponsor but should not fund individual participants.
This means that a company cannot pay an individual's tuition, but
could provide support to the event sponsor. That sponsor may in
turn provide grants to individuals to participate, or to reduce the
overall registration fees for all attendees.
(4) Consultants. Legitimate consulting or advisory arrangements are
appropriate, but token consulting arrangements should not be
used to justify payments to health care professionals.
Characteristics of legitimate consulting arrangements include the
retention of professionals based on their expertise (rather than as
a reward or inducement for prescriptions) and retaining no more
consultants than needed for the specific program. For example, it
would be inappropriate to retain 10,000 physicians for a program
that requires no more than 1,000 physicians, or to select them as a
reward for high prescribing.
(5) Educational and Health Care Practice Related Items. Educational
and practice-related items may be provided to health care
professionals, but should be for the health care benefit of patients
and of less-than-substantial value ($100 or less). Items for the
personal benefit of the health care professional should not be
offered or distributed. In short, nothing should be offered or
provided that would interfere with the independence of the health
care professional's prescribing practices.l10

102.

Id. at 2-5.
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4. FDA Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities
In 1997, the FDA published the Final Guidance on Industry-Supported
Scientific and Educational Activities.10 3 The setting for this rulemaking
started with requests from the pharmaceutical industry for guidance related
to industry-supported scientific and educational activities, which the FDA
has not traditionally regulated.' °4 However, such activities that are not
independent and non-promotional,
while they may not be per se illegal, are
05
regulation.'
to
subject
The FDA Final Guidance identifies the following factors for evaluating
industry-supported scientific and educational activities and determining
independence:
" Control of content and selection of presenters and moderators;
* Disclosures of relationships;
" The intent and focus of the program;
* Relationship between the provider and supporting company;
" Provider involvement in sales or marketing;
" Provider's demonstrated failure to meet standards on
independence;
* Number of presentations of same program;
* Selection of audience by sales or marketing departments;
* Opportunities for discussion;
" Dissemination of information about supporting company's
products;
* Contemporaneous ancillary promotional activities;
and
06
* Complaints about attempts to influence content.'
5. OIG Special Fraud Alert on Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes
In August 1994, the OIG issued a Special Fraud Alert related to
prescription drug marketing schemes. 10 7 The OIG uses fraud alerts0 8to
identify fraudulent and abusive practices within the health care industry.1
According to the Special Fraud Alert, prescription drug marketing
activities run the risk of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute in the
103. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62
Fed. Reg. 64,073 (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter FDA Final Guidance].
104. Code on Interactions, supra note 100, at 5.
105. FDA Final Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,074.
106. Id. at 64,096-99.
107. Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes, 59 Fed. Reg. 242, at
65,376 (Dec. 19, 1994).
108.

Id.
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following ways:
In recent years, prescription drug marketing companies in the United
States have increased their marketing activities among providers, patients
and suppliers such as pharmacies. Many prescription drug marketing
activities go far beyond traditional advertising and educational contacts.
Physicians, suppliers and, increasingly, patients are being offered
valuable, non-medical benefits in exchange for selecting specific
prescription drug brands. Traditionally, physicians and pharmacists have
been trusted to provide treatments and recommend products in the best
interest of the patient. In an era of aggressive drug marketing, however,
patients may now be using prescription drug items, unaware that their
physician or pharmacist is being compensated for promoting the selection
of a specified product. Prescription drugs supplied under one of these
programs are often reimbursed under Medicaid. Among the specific
activities, which the OIG has identified, are the following actual cases:
*

A "product conversion" program which resulted in 96,000
brand-name conversions. In this scenario, for instance, Drug
Company A offered a cash award to pharmacies for each time a
drug prescription was changed from Drug Company B's product
to Drug Company A's product. The pharmacies were induced to
help persuade physicians. who were unaware of the pharmacies'
financial interest, to change prescription.

*

A "frequent flier" campaign in which physicians were given
credit toward airline frequent flier mileage each time the
physician completed a questionnaire for a new patient placed on
the drug company's product.

*

A "research grant" program in which physicians were given
substantial payments for de minimis recordkeeping tasks. The
physician administered the drug manufacturer's product to the
patient and made brief notes, sometimes in a single word, about
the treatment outcome. Upon completion of a limited number of
such "studies," the physician received payment from the
manufacturer.

If one purpose of any of these marketing schemes is to induce the
provision of a prescription drug item reimbursable by Medicaid, then the
There is no statutory
criminal anti-kickback statute is implicated.
exception or "safe harbor" to protect such activities. Thus, a physician,
pharmacy or other practitioner or supplier receiving payment under these
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activities may be subject to criminal prosecution and exclusion from
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
A marketing program that is illegal under the anti-kickback statute may
pose a danger to patients because the offering or payment of
remuneration may interfere with a physician's judgment in determining
the most appropriate treatment for a patient. Further, where the patient is
a Medicaid beneficiary, these drug marketing practices may increase the
Federal government's costs of reimbursing suppliers for the products.
The OIG is investigating various drug marketing schemes, and enforcing
the anti-kickback laws where these practices affect the Federal health
109
care programs.

6. AMA Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from Industry
In 1992, the American Medical Association's (AMA) Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs first published guidelines on promotional gifts for
physicians, physicians-in-training,
and sales representatives of
pharmaceutical, device and medical equipment manufacturers."' 0 The
AMA has subsequently updated these guidelines through 2004. The
AMA's Working Group for the Communication of Ethical Guidelines on
Gifts to Physicians from Industry created the following statement intended
to provide guidance regarding the appropriateness of gift-giving between
industry and physicians:
Physicians have a unique professional relationship with patients and have
an ethical responsibility to place the health and welfare of the patient
ahead of economic self-interest. Physicians should be mindful that
accepting gifts or other remuneration that does not comply with ethical
guidelines may give the appearance of undue influence and jeopardize the
physician-patient relationship.
Industry and physicians should recognize that gifts that do not comply
with professional guidelines may compromise ethical principles. Industry
should share the responsibility to promote the health and welfare of
patients by complying with appropriate guidelines. "'

109. Id.
110. See Am. Med. Ass'n, Background and Overview of the Initiative (Jan. 26, 2005),
http://www.ama-assn.org.ama/pub/printcat/4002.html [hereinafter AMA Overview].
111. Am. Med. Ass'n, Statement of the Gifts to Physicians Working Group, (Nov. 9,
2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4003.html
[hereinafter AMA Gift
Statement]. Guidance for physicians and industry can be found in the current Code of
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The AMA Group stated that by failing to follow the guidelines, both
physicians and industry representatives are cast in a negative light. 1 2
The AMA Guidelines consist of seven guidelines along with answers to
frequently asked questions that provide additional guidance on specific
situations with which AMA member physicians may be confronted. The
guidelines provide:
(1) Any gifts accepted by physicians individually should primarily entail
a benefit to patients and should not be of substantial value. Accordingly,
textbooks, modest meals, and other gifts are appropriate if they serve a
genuine educational function. Cash payments should not be accepted.
The use of drug samples for personal or family use is permissible as long
as these practices do not interfere with patient access to drug samples. It
would not be acceptable for non-retired physicians to request free
pharmaceuticals for personal use or use by family members.
(2) Individual gifts of minimal value are permissible as long as the gifts
are related to the physician's work (e.g., pens and notepads).
(3) The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs defines a legitimate
'conference' or 'meeting' as any activity, held at an appropriate location,
where (a) the gathering is primarily dedicated, in both time and effort, to
promoting objective scientific and educational activities and discourse
(one or more educational presentation(s) should be the highlight of the
gathering), and (b) the main incentive for bringing attendees together is
An
to further their knowledge on the topic(s) being presented.
appropriate disclosure of financial support or conflict of interest should
be made.
(4) Subsidies to underwrite the costs of continuing medical education
conferences or professional meetings can contribute to the improvement
of patient care and therefore are permissible. Since the giving of a
subsidy directly to a physician by a company's representative may create
a relationship that could influence the use of the company's products, any
subsidy should be accepted by the conference's sponsor who in turn can
use the money to reduce the conference's registration fee. Payments to
defray the costs of a conference should not be accepted directly from the
Medical Ethics, published by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American

Medical Association and the ethics statements of medical specialty societies. See Am, Med.
Ass'n, Code of Med. Ethics, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4001.html (last
visted Nov. 21, 2005). In addition, codes of conduct associated with government, industry,
or other institutional employment may apply.
112. AMA Overview, supra note 110.
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company by the physicians attending the conference.
(5) Subsidies from industry should not be accepted directly or indirectly
to pay for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal expenses of
physicians attending conferences or meetings, nor should subsidies be
accepted to compensate for the physicians' time. Subsidies for hospitality
should not be accepted outside of modest meals or social events held as a
part of a conference or meeting. It is appropriate for faculty at
conferences or meetings to accept reasonable honoraria and to accept
reimbursement for reasonable travel, lodging, and meal expenses. It is
also appropriate for consultants who provide genuine services to receive
reasonable compensation and to accept reimbursement for reasonable
travel, lodging, and meal expenses. Token consulting or advisory
arrangements cannot be used to justify the compensation of physicians
for their time or their travel, lodging, and other out-of-pocket expenses.
(6) Scholarship or other special funds to permit medical students,
residents, and fellows to attend carefully selected educational conferences
may be permissible as long as the selection of students, residents, or
fellows who will receive the funds is made by the academic or training
institution. Carefully selected educational conferences are generally
defined as the major educational, scientific or policy-making meetings of
national, regional or specialty medical associations.
(7) No gifts should be accepted if there are strings attached. For
example, physicians should not accept gifts if they are given in relation to
the physicians' prescribing practices. In addition, when companies
underwrite medical conferences or lectures other than their own,
responsibility for and control over the selection of content, faculty,
educational methods, and materials should belong to the organizers of the
conferences or lectures. 113

The project to develop the AMA Guidelines was staffed by both industry
representatives and physician organizations. In addition to the AMA,
funding was provided by the American Medical Association Industry
Roundtable Steering Committee, Eli Lily & Co., Glaxo Wellcome, Merck
& Co., Pfizer, Pharmacia Corporation,4 AstraZeneca, Bayer Corp., Proctor
and Gamble and Wyeth-Ayerst Labs.'

113.
114.

AMA Gift Statement, supra note I11.
AMA Overview, supra note 110.
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7. Corporate Integrity Agreements
One result of the many settlements the OIG and DOJ have entered into
with pharmaceuticals manufacturers is that there are now numerous
corporate integrity agreements publicly available for companies to review
in connection with developing their own compliance programs.
Corporations generally enter into corporate integrity agreements in the
context of a negotiated settlement with the government. These agreements
show the elements of monitoring and ongoing compliance activities that the
government believes will be effective to keep the particular pharmaceutical
manufacturer, given the unique characteristics of its operations, from
violating the applicable laws, rules, and regulations. If a manufacturer is
proactively focused on never being compelled to enter into a corporate
integrity agreement with the government, it should use prior corporate
integrity agreements as a resource in designing its compliance programs to
meet or exceed the government's expectations.
B. Elements of an Effective Compliance Programfor Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers
1. Introduction
Because of the diversity of companies within the pharmaceutical
industry, the OIG recognizes there will not be a single "best"
pharmaceutical manufacturer compliance program. Some companies are
smaller, with limited human and financial resources to devote to
compliance.
Others are large multi-national companies with welldeveloped compliance programs already in place. Companies must design
and implement compliance programs that address the unique problems and
areas of concern and high risk for their particular business operations."1 5
2. Fundamental Elements of a Compliance Program
The Final OIG Guidance identifies the fundamental, widely recognized
elements of an effective compliance program:
(1) Implementing written policies and procedures;
(2) Designating a compliance officer and compliance committee;
(3) Conducting effective training and education;
(4) Developing effective lines of communication;
(5) Conducting internal monitoring and auditing;
(6) Enforcing standards through well-publicized disciplinary guidelines;

115.

Final O1G Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,732.
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(7) Responding promptly to detected
corrective action. 116

problems
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and undertaking

In order for a compliance program to be effective, it must have the
support and commitment of the company's senior management and
governing body." 7 The long-term benefits of establishing a compliance
program will significantly outweigh the initial costs related to designing
and implementing the program.' 1 8 For this advantage, however, the
program must be tailored to the organization and appropriate based on the
level of risk identified in the drug company's operations.
3. Major Risk Areas
The major potential areas of high risk for compliance identified by the
OIG for pharmaceutical manufacturers are:
" Integrity of data used by federal and state governments to
establish payment;
* Kickbacks and other illegal remuneration; and
* Compliance with laws regulating drug samples. 1 9
A compliance program should address these risk areas to the extent they
exist in a particular company's operations. However, the OIG cautions that
this list is not exhaustive of all the potential risk areas for pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Each company must conduct legal review of its own
practices and develop specific policies and procedures to reduce or
eliminate its particular risk. 120
a. Integrity of Data

The Final OIG Guidance states that pharmaceutical manufacturers are
responsible for ensuring the integrity of the data they generate for
government reimbursement purposes. 12 1 Many federal and state health care
programs establish or ultimately determine reimbursement rates for
pharmaceuticals, either prospectively or retrospectively, using price and
sales data directly or indirectly furnished by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Accordingly, the government sets reimbursements with the expectation that
116

1d. at 23,731.

117

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 23,733.
Id. at 23,732.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,734.

120
121.
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the data provided are complete and accurate. Knowingly submitting false,
fraudulent, or misleading information is actionable under the FCA or other
federal or state health care laws. '22
b. Kickbacks and Other Illegal Remuneration
The Final OIG Guidance emphasizes that drug companies, as well as
their employees and agents, should be aware that the Anti-Kickback Statute
prohibits practices in the health care industry that are common in other
industries. Those other practices may not be acceptable or even lawful
23
when soliciting federal health care program business.1
Although violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute depends on a party's
intent, the OIG suggests that a pharmaceutical manufacturer may initially
attempt to identify problematic arrangements or practices by focusing on
the following two areas:
*

Identify
any
remunerative
relationships
between
the
pharmaceutical manufacturer (or its employees or agents) and
persons in a position to directly or indirectly generate federal
health care program business for the manufacturer. Persons in a
position to generate such business include purchasers, benefit
managers, formulary committee members, group purchasing
organizations, physicians, and certain allied health professionals,
and pharmacists.

*

Determine whether any one purpose of the remuneration may be
to induce or reward the referral or recommendation of business
payable in whole or in part by a federal health care program. A
lawful purpose will not legitimize a payment that also has an
unlawful purpose. '4

If an arrangement or practice is identified as posing some degree of risk,
the Final OIG Guidance states that the pharmaceutical
manufacturer should
others: 2
ask itself the following questions, among
*

122,
123.
124.
125.

Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to interfere
with, or skew, clinical decision-making? Does it have a potential
to undermine the clinical integrity of a formulary process? If the

Id. at 23,733.
Id. at 23,734.
Id.
Id.
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arrangement or practice involves providing information to
decision makers, prescribers, or patients, is the information
complete, accurate, and not misleading?
"

Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase
costs to federal health care programs, beneficiaries, or enrollees?
Does the arrangement or practice have the potential to be a
disguised discount to circumvent the Medicaid Rebate Program
Best Price calculation?

*

Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase the
risk of over-utilization or inappropriate utilization?

*

Does the arrangement or practice raise patient safety or quality
126

of care concerns?

The OIG advises that arrangements or practices that present areas of risk
should be structured to fit within a safe harbor under the Anti-Kickback
Statute whenever possible. Other guidance is also available in the special
fraud alerts and advisory bulletins issued by the OIG.
The Final OIG Guidance identifies three primary groups as historical
sources of risk under the Anti-Kickback Statute due to their relationships
with pharmaceutical manufacturers: purchasers, including those using their
formularies, and their agents; persons in a position to make or influence
referrals,27 including physicians and other health care professionals; and sales
agents. 1
(1) Relationships with Purchasers and Their Agents
As a regular part of doing business, drug companies offer purchasers a
variety of price concessions and other remuneration to induce the purchase
of their products. Purchasers include both direct purchasers (like hospitals,
nursing homes, pharmacies, and some physicians) and indirect purchasers
(such as health plans). The OIG cautions that any remuneration from a
manufacturer to a purchaser that is expressly or impliedly related to a sale
potentially 28implicates the Anti-Kickback Statute and should be carefully
reviewed.1

126
127.

Id.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,735.

128

id. at 23,735.
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(a) Discounts and Other Remuneration to Purchasers
Pharmaceutical manufacturers offer purchasers a variety of price
concessions and other remuneration to encourage the purchase of their
products. Inducements offered to purchasers potentially implicate the AntiKickback Statute if the products are reimbursable to the purchasers under a
federal health care program, either in whole or in part, directly or indirectly.
Any remuneration from a manufacturer to the purchaser that is expressly or
impliedly tied to a sale potentially implicates the Anti-Kickback Statute and
should be carefully scrutinized.' 29
(i) Discounts
Discounts are prevalent in the health care industry. Because public
policy favors open and legitimate price competition, the Anti-Kickback
Statute includes a safe harbor for discounts that are properly disclosed and
accurately reported. 130
The OIG believes that discounting arrangements deserve special
attention in the pharmaceutical industry because of their likelihood of
31
implicating the best price requirements of the Medicaid rebate program.'
The OIG goes on to suggest that "because the Medicaid rebate program in
many instances requires that states receive rebates based on the best price
offered by a manufacturer to other purchasers, manufacturers have a strong
financial incentive to hide de facto pricing concessions
to other purchasers
32
to avoid passing on the same discount to the states."
(ii) Product Support Services
Product support services offered by pharmaceutical manufacturers to
purchasers, such as billing assistance and reimbursement consultation, are
133
not problematic under the Anti-Kickback Statute when standing alone.
However, the OIG believes that when product support services that have no
independent value are offered in connection with another service or
program that does afford a benefit to the referring provider, such as a
reimbursement guarantee that eliminates normal financial risk, the AntiKickback Statute is implicated.

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. The discount safe harbor is at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2004).
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,735.

132.

Id. at 23,735.

133.

Id.

134.

Id.
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(iii) Educational Grants
Educational grants funded by pharmaceutical manufacturers can be a
source of valuable information to the medical and health care industries.
However, funding that is conditioned, either in whole or in part, on the
purchase of a product implicates the Anti-Kickback Statute. 3 5 The Final
OIG Guidance states that manufacturers should completely separate their
grant-making functions from their sales and marketing functions to reduce
the risk that grant 36programs may be used improperly to induce purchases or
market products.1
(iv) Research Funding
Contracts between manufacturers and purchasers of pharmaceuticals to
conduct research activities on behalf of the manufacturer implicate the AntiKickback Statute. The OIG suggests that the function of awarding research
contracts should be separated from sales and marketing to reduce the risk of
violations. These contracts should also be structured to fit within the
personal services safe harbor under the Anti-Kickback Statute.'3 7
(v) Other Remuneration
The Final OIG Guidance identifies other problematic situations under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, wherein a pharmaceutical manufacturer may
provide remuneration to a purchaser of its products. These include
"prebates" and "upfront payments," other free or reduced-price goods or
services, payments to cover the costs of "converting" from a competitor's
38
product, and selective offers based on the volume or value of purchases.'
(b) FormulariesandFormularySupport Activities

Although formulary support activities are an essential element of
successful pharmacy benefits management, the OIG has determined there is
the potential for abuse under certain circumstances. 39 First, relationships
between pharmaceutical companies, formulary committee members of
health plans, and other drug purchasers, and any remuneration flowing out
of those relationships must be carefully scrutinized. 40 Second, rebates or
135.
136.
137.

Id.

Id. at 23,735-36.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,736-37. The personal services safe harbor

is at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2004).
138.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,736.
139. Id. at 23,7 3 6.
140
Id.
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other payments by drug manufacturers to pharmacy benefit managers that
are based on or otherwise related to the PBM customer purchases may
implicate the Anti-Kickback Statute.' 4'
These contracts should be
142
structured to satisfy the group purchasing organization safe harbor.
Finally, lump sum payments for inclusion in a formulary or for exclusive or
43
restricted formulary status are problematic.
(c) Average Wholesale Price

The Final OIG Guidance states that the Anti-Kickback Statute is
implicated if a pharmaceutical manufacturer purposefully manipulates the
average wholesale price to increase its customer's profit by increasing the
amount the federal health care programs reimburses its customer.' 44 This
can occur because, in many situations under the federal health care
programs, pharmaceutical manufacturers control not only the amount at
which they sell a product to their customers, but also the amount those
customers will be reimbursed by federal health care programs. 45 It is
illegal for a manufacturer to knowingly establish or inappropriately
maintain a particular average wholesale price if one purpose is to
manipulate the "spread" to induce customers to purchase its products.1
The Final OIG Guidance recommends that pharmaceutical manufacturers
review their average wholesale price reporting practices and methodology
to ensure they are not influenced by marketing considerations.1 47 The OIG
recognizes manipulation of the average wholesale price to induce customers
to purchase a product, along with active marketing of the spread, as strong
evidence48 of the unlawful intent necessary to trigger the Anti-Kickback
Statute.
(2) Relationships with Physicians and Other Persons in a Position to Make
or Influence Referrals
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and their agents are involved in numerous
relationships with persons in a position to refer, order, prescribe (or
influence the referral, ordering, or prescribing of) drugs, even though the

141.

Id.

142.
(2004).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.

148.

The group purchasing organization safe harbor is at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.9520)

Final
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

O1G Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,736.
23,736-37.
23,736.
23,737.

Id.
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persons or entities may themselves not purchase (or in the case of group
purchasing organizations and pharmacy benefits manufacturers, arrange for
the purchase of) those drugs. 149 Pharmaceutical manufacturers frequently
cultivate relationships with physicians in a variety of ways, including gifts,
entertainment, and personal service compensation arrangements.1 50 The
OIG cautions that these types of relationships are inherently risky under the
Anti-Kickback Statute and historically have generated a substantial number
of violations. 15'
Whenever possible, these relationships should be
structured to fit within an available safe harbor under the Anti-Kickback
Statute, such as the personal services and management contracts or
employee safe harbors. 52 If an arrangement cannot be structured to fit
squarely within a safe harbor, the OIG advises that it should be evaluated in
light of the totality of all the facts and circumstances, including the
following factors, among others:
* Nature of the relationship between the parties;
* Manner in which the remuneration is determined;
* Value of the remuneration;
* Potential federal health care program impact of the
remuneration; and
* Potential conflicts of interest.153
(a) Consultingand Advisory Payments
It is common for pharmaceutical manufacturers to engage physicians and
other health care professionals in the provision of personal services to the
company, such as consulting or advising. 154 The OIG is concerned with
"consulting" arrangements under which physicians are expected to attend
meetings or conferences in a passive capacity and with arrangements
connected to marketing and sales activities of a manufacturer. 155 The Final
OIG Guidance recommends that arrangements for services between
pharmaceutical manufacturers and physicians and other health care
providers be structured
to comply with a safe harbor under the Anti56
1
Statute.
Kickback

149.
150.
151.
152.

Final O1G Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,737.
Id.
Id.
Id. The personal services and management contracts safe harbor is at 42 C.F.R. §

1001.952(d) (2004), and the safe harbor for employees is at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (2004).

153.
154.
155.
156.

Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,737.
Id.
Id.
Id. The personal services safe harbor is at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2004).
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(b) Pavmentsfior Detailing
The OIG states that it is highly suspect under the Anti-Kickback Statute
for pharmaceutical manufacturers to compensate physicians for time spent
listening to sales representatives market their products or for time spent
accessing web sites to view or listen to marketing information. 57 The Final
OIG Guidance strongly discourages these types of activities. 5 8
(c) Business Courtesies and Other Gratuities
If a purpose of the variety of remunerative relationships between
pharmaceutical manufacturers and physicians or others in a position to
influence referrals for the purchase of products is to generate business for
the manufacturer, the Anti-Kickback Statute is potentially implicated.' 59
Examples of these relationships include entertainment, recreation, travel,
meals, or other benefits in association with information or marketing
presentations, and gifts, gratuities, and other business courtesies. 60 The
OIG recommends compliance with the PhRMA Code when participating in
these types of activities in order to substantially
reduce the manufacturer's
161
risk of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute.
(d) Educational and Research Funding
The Final OIG Guidance cautions that contracts for research activities
between a physician and pharmaceutical manufacturer originating from
marketing and product promotion are problematic. 62 The contracts should
be structured to fit63within the personal services safe harbor under the AntiKickback Statute. 1

(3) Relationships with Sales Agents
The OIG states that a pharmaceutical manufacturer's commitment to an
effective fraud and abuse compliance program can often be determined in
large part by the company's commitment to training and monitoring its
sales force. 64 Because sales agents, whether employees or independent

157. Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,378.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Final OIG Guidance, supra note 5, at 23,738. The personal services safe harbor is
at 42 CFR 1001.952(d) (2004).
164. Final OIG Guidance, supranote 5, at 23,739.
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contractors, are paid to recommend and arrange for the purchase of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer's products, their compensation arrangements
should also be carefully reviewed and structured to comply with the
employment or personal services safe harbors to the greatest extent
possible. 165 The OIG advises that if an arrangement does not fit with a safe
harbor, the following factors should be considered: the amount of
compensation, the identity of the sales agent engaged in the marketing or
promotional activity, the sales agent's relationship with his audience, the
nature of the marketing or promotional activity, the item or service being
66
promoted or marketed, and the composition of the target audience.1
Finally, the OIG warns that a compensation arrangement satisfying a safe
harbor can still evince a manufacturer's improper intent under the AntiKickback Statute.167 For example, if the manufacturer provides sales
employees with unusually large bonuses or expense accounts, an inference
that the manufacturer is intentionally motivating the sales force through
68
lavish entertainment and other improper remuneration may be drawn.1
c. Compliance with Laws Regulating Drug Samples
The Final OIG Guidance states that the provision of drug samples is a
widespread industry practice that can benefit patients, but can also pose
potential risks to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 169 Manufacturers should
closely follow the requirements of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of
1987 (PDMA) 170 with risk of violations generally under the PDMA itself as
well as under the FCA and the Anti-Kickback Statute.' 7' The OIG advises
that manufacturers may minimize their risk of violations by: (1) training
their sales force to meaningfully inform sample recipients that samples may
not be sold or billed; (2) clearly and conspicuously labeling individual
samples as units that may not be sold; and (3) including on packaging and
any documentation related to the samples a conspicuous
notice that the
72
samples are subject to the PDMA and may not be sold.

165.

Id.

166.

Id.

167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,739.

170. Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) of 1987, 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(1) (2000).
The PDMA governs the distribution of drug samples and forbids their sale.
171. Final OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 27,739.
172. Id.
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IV. "HOT"

LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSULS TO BE AWARE OF AS

2006

GETS UNDERWAY
A new slate of legal and regulatory challenges face pharmaceutical
manufacturers in 2006 and the years that follow against the backdrop of the
confusion and uncertainty that already exists in the pharmaceutical industry
because of the increased governmental scrutiny and attention of the
plaintiff s bar. This section provides an overview of several of these
challenges and how they may require changes in the way business is
conducted by pharmaceutical manufacturers and the providers and suppliers
with which they conduct federal health care program business.
A. Drug Re-Importation-The FDA Versus the States
Legalization of the re-importation of prescription drugs from Canada and
Western European countries could have a tremendous impact on
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Re-importation of prescription drugs is a
result of the federal policy of banning wholesalers from selling drugs back
to the United States. 17 3 Even though the FDA does not think that legalizing
prescription drug re-importation is appropriate, state governments are
challenging the system and attempting to import drugs from Canada and
certain Western European countries. In fact, a growing number of states
and cities are defying federal law and the power of the pharmaceutical
industry by helping people buy prescriptions drugs from abroad. For
example, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and the District
of Columbia are pointing residents to websites of prescreened foreign
pharmacies. 17 4 Moreover, the State of Rhode Island enacted a law in 2004
allowing pharmacies licensed in Canada to do business in Rhode Island, 717 56
and the California legislature has passed a packet of re-importation bills.
In all, twenty-four states have considered such measures.1 77 Vermont even
filed a lawsuit against the FDA in August 2004 after the agency rejected the
a program for the
state's request to set up a pilot program to establish
178
importation of prescription drugs from Canada.
173. Tomas J. Philipson. Long-Term Ramifications of Reimportation for the Health
Care System, MANAGED CARE, June 2004, Vol. 13, No. 6, at 17, 17.
174. Patricia Barry, States Defy FDA on Drug Importation, AARP Bulletin, Oct. 2004,
20 0 4
-10-08-fdaimportation.html.
http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/prescription/a
175. FDA issued a detailed letter warning the Rhode Island Attorney General of the
illegality of such imports and potential liability. See Letter from William K. Hubbard, FDA,
to Patrick C. Lynch, Rhode Island Attorney General (Jan. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/importdrugs/lynch012805.htnl.
176. Barry, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. Statement on Vermont's Lawsuit on Importing Prescription Drugs from Canada
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The Bush administration and drug makers are adamantly opposed to any
re-importation bill because they contend that legalizing re-importation
would open American borders to a flood of counterfeit and unsafe
medicines. 79 In addition, there is concern that allowing large American
pharmacy chains and wholesalers to import drugs in huge quantities could
swamp the Canadian market and even prompt the Canadian government,
which controls0 drug prices through its health system, to close down crossborder trade.18
B. FullDisclosure of Clinical Trials
The FDA wants to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to fully
disclose all clinical trial findings before making a determination about
recalling prescription drugs. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have been
accused of selection bias in reporting clinical trial results by highlighting
positive trials while playing down or burying negative data. One recent
example involved the pediatric use of antidepressants. 8 ' The FDA is
proposing that any and all adverse events reported in clinical trials be
disclosed to the FDA. Furthermore, those in the medical industry are
encouraging the FDA to make those clinical trial results available and
accessible to health care providers, researchers, and the public.
On October 7, 2004, the Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act of 2004 bill
was introduced to Congress. This bill would require prescription drugs and
medical device manufacturers to register clinical trials of their products in a
public database before they begin testing and then report the results. 82 This
bill modifies an existing federal law that requires the disclosure of clinical
trials to a government database. 8 3 The FDA, however, has not enforced
this already existing federal law, primarily because the statute does not
explicitly give the agency authority to crack down on violators or impose
penalties. 8 4 The new bill, however, provides an enforcement mechanism
by which the FDA can penalize and sanction pharmaceutical manufacturers
(Aug. 20, 2004), availableat http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics'news/2004/NEW 0 1107.html.

179.

Patricia Barry and Barbara Basler, Battle Lines Drawn on Rx Imports, AARP

Bulletin (July-Aug.

2004), http://www.arp.org/bulletin/prescriptionlArticles/a2004-06-22-

reimportation.html.
180. Barry and Basler, supra note 179.
181. Barry Meier, Drug Industry Plans Release of More Data About Studies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at C4, available at htlp://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/07/business/

07trials.html.
182.

H.R. 5252, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2933, 108th Cong. (2004).

183.

See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-

115, § 113 (1997), availableat http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/105-115.htm.
184. Shankar Vedantam, USA: Drugmakers Prefer Silence on Test Data, WASH. POST,
July 6, 2004, at Al.
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who do not comply with the disclosure requirements.
In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers have been investigated over
how they disclose information from clinical studies. The New York
Attorney General's Office inquired into GlaxoSmithKline's non-disclosure
of certain clinical studies of Paxil under the theory it had misrepresented or
concealed material facts by not disclosing negative clinical trial results. 8'
GlaxoSmithKline entered into a settlement agreement whereby it became
the first major pharmaceutical manufacturer to publicly disclose
information on clinical studies of its drugs. Specifically, GlaxoSmithKline
agreed to release both positive and negative studies about the safety and
86
efficacy of its drugs. 1
Some pharmaceutical manufacturers are even voluntarily releasing more
information about clinical trial results.
Faced with pressure from
lawmakers and editors of medical journals, four trade groups representing
the world's biggest pharmaceutical manufacturers said that their members
planned to release more data about clinical drug trials.' 87 The plans, which
are voluntary on the companies' part, reflect an effort by the pharmaceutical
manufacturers to defuse controversies over clinical trials, such as the
concealment of negative clinical trial results. 8
Pharmaceutical
manufacturers need to be aware of the trends being set to voluntarily
register clinical trials and then publicly release information about the results
of the clinical trials.
C. Mandator, Compliance-RecentCaliforniaLegislation
California's new statute, SB 1765, effective July 1, 2005, converts
voluntary industry guidance into legally binding standards. 8 9 SB 1765
requires pharmaceutical companies to adopt and publicly disclose a
comprehensive compliance program that is in accordance with the Final
OIG Guidance and the PhRMA Code, establish specific annual dollar limits
on gifts or incentives provided to medical or health care professionals, and
make an annual declaration of compliance publicly available.' 90 This
185. Assistant New York Attorney General Warns Pharma Not to Underestimate the
Investigative Scope ofInformation Disclosure Cases, 3 Rx COMPLIANCE REP., Dec. 3, 2004,
at 6.
186. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Eliot Spitzer, Settlement Sets New
Standard for Release of Drug Information (Aug. 26, 2004), available at
4
26
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/aug aO0 .html.
181.
note
supra
Meier,
187.
188. Id.
189. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETYCODE §§ 119400,119402 (West 2005).
190. New California Law Mandating Pharma Compliance Programs Riddled with
Unanswered Questions, 3 Rx COMPLIANCE REP., Dec. 3, 2004, at 2 (hereinafter Unanswered
Questions].
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statute presents a number of implementation challenges that may require
manufacturers to develop expensive new systems or expand pre-existing
ones. "' 1 The reason that the statute may be difficult to implement is that
there are many ambiguities and other aspects of the statute that raise
significant questions.
As a result of the broad definition of a
"pharmaceutical company," which may or may not include out-of-state
pharmaceutical companies doing business in California, it is unclear what
the scope of SB 1765 is and to what extent it affects companies based
outside of California. 92 In addition, requiring pharmaceutical companies to
comply with the Final OIG Guidance is difficult because it merely provided
recommendations and not "requirements," thus giving pharmaceutical
manufacturers a tough time in discerning the subtle differences. 93 Finally,
while the statute does not identify a specific enforcement mechanism, there
are ways the government and the plaintiffs bar could attack pharmaceutical
companies. Pharmaceutical companies are subject to allegations of unfair
business practices under the Unfair Competition Law of the California
Business and Professions Code § 17200.C4 In addition, False Claims Act
liability could arise under the California False Claims Act and Section
95
1871.7 of the California Insurance Code. 1
The lesson to take away is that pharmaceutical manufacturers around the
country need to watch what happens in California to see how the federal
and state governments and the plaintiffs bar proceed in making claims
against pharmaceutical manufacturers under SB 1765.
D. State Marketing and Gift Reports - Minnesota and Vermont
Some states have enacted laws that require pharmaceutical manufacturers
to report gifts and marketing expenditures to state regulatory bodies.
Minnesota has a statute prohibiting pharmaceutical manufacturers from
making certain gifts to "practitioners" 196 and a related statute that imposes
reporting obligations when giving certain non-prohibited payments to
191. Id. See also Pfizer Corporate Compliance Code, stating that "Pursuant to
California SB 1765, Pfizer has modified certain policies and procedures that regulate
interactions with covered medical and health care professionals in the State of California.
Pfizer has set a specific annual dollar limit on gifts, promotional materials, or items or
activities that we may give or otherwise provide to an individual medical or health care
professional pursuant to the [OIG Guidance] and with the PhRMA Code," available at
http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/subsites/corporate-citizenship/corporate-compliance.jsp
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2005).
192.

Unanswered Questions, supra note 190, at 2.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2005).
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practitioners. 19 7
Minnesota's gift statute generally prohibits any
"manufacturer or wholesale drug distributor, or any agent thereof" from
offering or giving any gift of value to a "practitioner."' 98 A "gift" does not
include: samples of a drug provided to doctors for free distribution to
patients, items with a total combined retail value of less than $50 in any
calendar year, payments to sponsors of medical conferences or meetings if
certain requirements are met, reasonable honoraria or payments of
reasonable expenses of a practitioner serving as faculty at a professional
conference or meeting, compensation for substantial professional or
consultation services of a doctor in connection with research projects,
publications and educational materials, or salaries or other benefits paid to
employees. 99 In addition, manufacturers and wholesale drug distributors
are required to report specified non-prohibited payments to practitioners. 200
Annual reports to the Minnesota Board of Pharmacy must identify all
payments made to practitioners in Minnesota during the preceding calendar
year that fall within the exceptions in the statute, 20as1 well as all payments
totaling more than $100 to a particular practitioner.
Vermont also has a statute imposing various disclosure requirements on
20
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. 2°
2 The statute generally requires
"pharmaceutical manufacturing companies" to make annual disclosures to
the Office of the Attorney General.20 3 With specified exceptions, a
manufacturer's annual submission must disclose "the value, nature and
purpose of any gift, fee, payment, subsidy or other economic benefit
provided in connection with detailing, promotional, or other marketing
activities by the company, directly or through its pharmaceutical marketers,
to any physician, hospital, nursing home, pharmacist, health benefit plan
administrator or any other person in Vermont authorized to prescribe,
dispense, or purchase prescription drugs."

°

In addition, another new

Vermont statute, the Pharmaceutical Marketer Price Disclosure Law,

197. MINN. STAT. § 151.47 (2005).
198. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2005); see also MINN. STAT. §151.01 (2005). The
definition of "practitioner" includes a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, optometrist,
podiatrist, or veterinarian, as well as physician assistants and advanced practice nurses
authorized to prescribe, dispense, and administer drugs.
199. MINN. STAT. §151.461 (2005).
200. MINN. STAT. §151.47 (2005).
201. MINN. STAT. § 151.47 (2005).
202. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 2005 (2005).
203. The term "pharmaceutical manufacturing company" is defined broadly, but
excludes wholesale drug distributors and pharmacists. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 2005(c)(5)
(2005).
204. VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 33 § 2005 (2005).
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governs the type of marketing conducted by pharmaceutical marketers.
This statute states that when a pharmaceutical marketer engages in any form
of prescription drug marketing directly to a physician or other person
authorized to prescribe prescription drugs, the marketer shall disclose the
average wholesale price of the drugs being marketed.2 °6 In conjunction
with this statute, the Vermont Attorney General's Office issued a proposed
guide to compliance with the Pharmaceutical Marketer Price Disclosure
Law.
In addition to Minnesota and Vermont, there are several other states that
are considering new laws to regulate marketing related payments by
pharmaceutical manufacturers to potential prescribers.2 °7
These state
regulations underscore the importance of keeping up to date with changes in
state laws that require pharmaceutical manufacturers to increasingly
disclose more about its relationships with doctors, hospitals, health
maintenance organizations, or other entities authorized to prescribe drugs.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must be attentive and conscientious about
compliance with federal and state regulations governing their relationships
with potential prescribers.
E. GPO Practices
The OIG Work Plan identifies a continued focus on how group
purchasing organizations and their members use revenue from vendor
fees.2 °8 The OIG plans to analyze the impact of group purchasing
organization arrangements on the Medicare program, including how their
owners and members report vendor fees on Medicare cost reports. 0 9
F. Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising
Consumers today are faced with an overwhelming amount of choices in
prescription drug theory. This decision is made even more difficult by
creative pharmaceutical advertising and marketing that results in decisions
being made on the glitz and glamour portrayed in drug advertisements as
opposed to medical decisions by medical professionals that are in the best
interest of the patient.21 ° On July 1, 2005, Senate Majority Leader Bill

205.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 2005a (2005).

206.
207.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 2005a(a) (2005).
NCSL Reports at least 48 Drug Marketing Bills, 4 Rx COMPLIANCE REP., May 20,

2005.
208.

209.

01G Work Plan, supranote 4, at 42.
Id.

210. Senate Majority Leader Frist Targets Direct-To-Consumer Drug Marketing,
HEALTH LAW. WKLY., July 8, 2005.
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Frist, M.D. (R-TN) asked pharmaceutical companies to voluntarily impose
ban on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising for all new
a two-year
21
drugs.
This request follows plans announced by the American Medical
2 12 In
Association on June 21, 2005, to further study DTC drug advertising.
a June 13, 2005, web site posting, Bristol-Myers Squibb drug company
promised to voluntarily refrain from promoting its drugs directly to
consumers for at least one year. 13 Osteopathic physicians have also
214 On July 21, 2005,
recently sought to limit drug ads aimed at consumers.
approved by PhRMA. 21
direct to consumer guidelines were totentatively
the coming months.
in
monitor
interest
great
of
topic
This is another
V. CONCLUSION

The confusion and uncertainty in the legal and regulatory environment
surrounding the sale of prescription drug products will create opportunities
in 2006 and beyond for those pharmaceutical manufacturers and the
providers and suppliers with which they conduct federal health care
program business to embrace the challenges and modify their practices in
order to comply with the current requirements and attempt to stay ahead of
the evolving requirements.
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215. Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of Directors (July 21,
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Approval
'Guiding Principles' Receive Preliminary
2
1.07.2005.1193.cfm.
2005), availableat http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/
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